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ABSTRACT: This article explores the individual, situational, and
system roles influencing the 2011 incident in which a small unit of
US Marine scout snipers urinated on three Taliban corpses. Without
absolving individual responsibility, the authors emphasize a strong
command climate is the most important influence behind ethical
and professional behavior.

I

n the waning days of 2011, the leaders of 3d Battalion, 2d
Marine Regiment, could justifiably reflect with pride on the unit’s
accomplishments during the past year. Tasked with a key role in the
largest, most austere area of operations in northern Helmand province,
the commanding officer instituted a comprehensive ethical warrior
program into every aspect of operations and through each phase of
training, combat operations, and post-deployment recovery.
During the seven-month deployment, 3/2 garnered high praise for
its innovative tactics and for the exploits of its successful scout sniper
platoon. The Commandant and the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps
subsequently hosted a congratulatory breakfast for the scout sniper
platoon. The battalion even garnered national attention and praise when
actress Mila Kunis attended its post-deployment Marine Corps Birthday
Ball in November 2011.
With the loss of six marines and one US Navy corpsman, the
deployment had been challenging and difficult. But, the battalion had
returned triumphantly with its honor clean. Little did it suspect, twelve
days into the new year, a 39-second video clip posted on YouTube would
forever transform the legacy of that deployment. The video showed four
marines from the unit urinating on the bodies of a few Taliban fighters.
This article explores the professional and ethical dimensions of the
four marines’ actions and focuses on why the event happened. The main
objective is to understand whether this unit of marines fully grasped the
ethical implications of its behavior.
We analyze the urination incident by adopting the ethical
decision-making typology of outcomes developed by Ann Tenbrunsel
and Kristin Smith-Crowe. Their typology “distinguishing between
the process that produced the decision (moral or amoral decisionmaking) and the decision that resulted (ethical or unethical), produces
four different outcomes—intended ethicality, unintended ethicality,

1     The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and Colonel Timothy S. Mundy
for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this article.
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intended unethicality, and unintended unethicality.”2 Tenbrunsel and
Smith-Crowe explained “the moral decision-making that follows from
moral awareness can result in unethical decisions as well as ethical
ones; likewise, the amoral decision-making that follows from moral
unawareness can lead to ethical decisions as well as unethical ones.”3
Thus, the incident potentially falls into the categories of intended
unethicality, and more likely, unintended unethicality.
Our research indicates the marines associated with the incident
accepted the behavior as normal: urinating on dead enemies was not a
desecration, or a war crime, but a strong victory statement made against
an extremely cruel enemy. In the moment, it is questionable whether the
marines clearly perceived the unethical dimension of what they were
doing. To the extent their behavior had become normal—a victory
statement—such behavior also became unintentional. Thus, it is very
likely the action occurred in a condition of ethical blindness. At least one
marine came to regret his action, which is consistent with a temporary
inability to see the ethical dimension of such behavior. Several marines,
however, showed no regrets for their roles, which leads to the belief
that they intentionally engaged in unethical behavior. It can be argued
their perceptions of the conditions in which they operated, no longer
filtered by a healthy command climate, removed ethical thinking from
their decision-making. Thus, their conduct would be consistent with
unintended unethicality.
To understand what led these experienced and high-performing
marines to engage in such unethical and unprofessional actions, we
explore three main elements significant to explaining human behavior.
First, we focus on the individual to understand whether these marines
exhibited or had different characteristics from other marines and,
therefore, might have been more inclined to engage in unethical behavior.
Second, on the situation to evaluate whether these marines operated
in an exceptional environment, which contributed to their unethical
behavior. Third, on the system, the organization they belonged to, to
evaluate whether it failed to promote ethical behavior and actually might
have encouraged unethical behavior. We posit the consequential element
of this system to be the command climate.
Unethical behavior is the result of several elements failing. Indeed,
a functioning and resilient system should be able to prevent unethical
behavior. Yet the following analysis provides strong evidence that the
command climate in which these marines operated over a number of
months had degraded to a dangerous level. This finding does not excuse
the behavior of the individual marines nor absolve them of responsibility
for their actions.
Our objective is to provide an opportunity to reflect on the role of
the command climate, or the system, to determine the behavior of unit
members and to ensure it is prepared for difficult challenges, particularly
in highly stressful situations such as combat. More important, this article
emphasizes the pivotal role commanders play in shaping command
2       Ann E. Tenbrunsel and Kristin Smith-Crowe, “Ethical Decision Making: Where
We’ve Been and Where We’re Going,” Academy of Management Annals 2, no. 1 (2008): 553,
doi:10.1080/19416520802211677.
3      Ibid., 554.
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climate. Particular attention is given to the problematic phenomenon
that well-meaning leaders might unintentionally create conditions
leading to unethical behavior.

Outstanding Platoon

The marines of the sniper platoon were extremely experienced;
several of them were tactically savvy and adaptable thinkers. Many
had seen combat in its ugliest face. For those who had separated, their
sense of brotherhood and service caused them to return to the Marine
Corps and to volunteer for deployment. Marines have unique and special
motivations and bonding that are often even stronger for a tight-knit
unit such as the scout snipers.
The scout sniper platoon of 3/2 was shaped mostly by its platoon
leader, Staff Sergeant Joseph W. Chamblin. Chamblin joined the platoon
in late summer 2010 believing he would be the platoon sergeant. He had
been a marine for 15 years, 10 of which as a sniper. He had deployed
on missions abroad several times and already had seen combat in both
Afghanistan and Iraq.4 As a result of the battalion struggling to fill all
of the officer billets while preparing for the deployment to Afghanistan,
and likely because the commanding officer wanted an experienced sniper
in charge of the platoon rather than a young junior officer, Chamblin
was selected to take command of the platoon.
The immediate challenge was to prepare the platoon for the
deployment to Afghanistan. Chamblin remembered: “Unfortunately,
the starting point wasn’t good. The Platoon’s reputation wasn’t stellar
in the Battalion or the sniper community. When I arrived, the platoon
had fourteen men and only one school trained scout/sniper or HOG
[Hunter of Gunmen].”5
A few years earlier, while a scout sniper instructor in Quantico,
Virginia, Chamblin had plenty of opportunities to meet, train, and
develop many experienced, outstanding, and committed marines. In
his new role as platoon commander, Chamblin asked some of them
to join the platoon. Sergeant Robert W. Richards—a marine since
2007 who had completed a tour of duty in Garmsir, Afghanistan, with
1/6—accepted. Other marines respected Richards, and he understood
the most effective way to employ snipers. During the battle of Marjah
(Operation Moshtarak) in February 2010, Richards was seriously
wounded by an improvised explosive device (IED).6 His psychological
wounds matched his physical wounds; he qualified for 100 percent
disability. Yet Richards recovered from the physical wounds and coped
with the psychological ones. Once removed from limited duty status,
he returned to the Marines. Initially Richards was supposed to mentor
the less experienced snipers. Yet, the more time he spent with the scout
sniper platoon, the clearer it became in his mind that he needed, but also
wanted, to deploy with them. He became the leader of Team 4.

4        Joe Chamblin, Into Infamy: A Marine Sniper’s War, with Milo Afong (Middletown, DE:
CreateSpace Publishing, 2015), 109.
5      Ibid., 113.
6      Hope Hodge Seck, “Marine Sniper Rob Richards Died from Drug Toxicity: Autopsy,” Marine
Corps Times, November 30, 2014.
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By the fall of 2010, the platoon had gone through intensive training.
Out of the 39 marines and 2 sailors, “twenty-three of the Marines were
school trained HOGs, and the others were hand selected, exceptional
infantrymen.” 7 In addition to completing tactical training, all 3/2
units were directed to incorporate ethics instruction in every aspect
of training, and to conduct two hours of focused ethical instruction
every week. Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Christopher G.
Dixon, a veteran of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, understood
the demanding uncertainties of a dispersed, counterinsurgency
environment. In his view, the mission required the marines of 3/2 to be
ethical warriors, “to show restraint in the use of force and sometimes
accept tactical risk, in order to protect the people and to support our
strategic goals.”8
The battalion’s ethical warrior program sought “to develop highperforming individuals and small units who are morally, psychologically,
and emotionally resilient in order to operate, live and thrive on an
austere battlefield defined by fog, friction and severe stress.”9 Small unit
discussions and ethical decision games were conducted. An ethical warrior
reading list was posted to the battalion’s shared drive. The program
continued during combat operations in Afghanistan. Significantly,
prior to and following each mission, small-team leaders were to address
and debrief potential or encountered ethical dilemmas, making the
“harder-right” a matter of “muscle-memory.”10 Finally, the program
helped post-deployment marines develop resilience and minimize posttraumatic stress. The marines of 3/2 probably completed more ethics
training than other units who had deployed to either Afghanistan or
Iraq. Moreover, the ethics training concept, which focused on small
group discussions led by leaders in the platoon and in smaller units,
was sound.
Early in 2011, the battalion relieved 1/8, in Helmand Province,
Afghanistan, a widely-recognized Taliban stronghold. Historically, bloody
fighting between the International Security Assistance Force troops and
the Taliban occurred in Helmand. Despite the great commitment of
resources and lives, the province remained very unstable and volatile.
The Musa Qala and Now Zad districts, where the battalion was deployed,
were particularly dangerous, hotly contested areas. Chamblin deployed
one sniper team to Now Zad, nicknamed Apocalypse Now Zad, and the
rest of the platoon to Musa Qala.11
The marine snipers proved to be extremely effective from the start,
killing a significant number of Taliban. The enemy called them “ghosts”
as they were able to hit hard and remain unseen.12 The most innovative
tactic adopted by the snipers put them in a leading role with the support
of a tank unit. In a few months the snipers’ accomplishments were
known and acknowledged beyond the battalion. Three months into the
7      Chamblin, 116.
8      E. G. Clayton, Letter of Instruction, “3d Battalion, 2d Marines Ethical Warrior Program,”
October 1, 2010, Camp Lejeune, NC.
9      Ibid.
10      Ibid.
11       Dan Lamothe, “3/2 Marines Replace 1/8 in Musa Qala, Now Zad,” BattleRattle (blog),
Marine Corps Times, March 30, 2011, http://battlerattle.marinecorpstimes.com/2011/03/30/32
-marines-replace-18-in-musa-qala-now-zad/.
12      Chamblin, 130.
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deployment, the platoon had more than 70 confirmed kills.13 Chamblin
wrote, “the command couldn’t have been more pleased with our work
and results.”14
Major General John A. Toolan, the commanding officer of II
Marine Expeditionary Force and the commander of Regional Command
Southwest in Afghanistan, did not miss the excellent performance of the
tanks and snipers that resulted in 50 kills in 10 days, noting the likelihood
of individuals with “upwards of 100 kills.”15 Toolan even visited with the
platoon to congratulate them on their successes.
Towards the end of the deployment, while the marines of the
scout sniper platoon were waiting to return to the United States, thenCommandant of the Marine Corps General James F. Amos—who was
on a visit to Afghanistan with Sergeant Major Micheal P. Barrett, the
sergeant major of the Marine Corps—decided to have breakfast with
the platoon. The platoon’s achievement had been acknowledged by
many at different levels, but to have the Commandant do so in person
was extremely flattering. The snipers received challenge coins from the
Commandant and words of praise. Chamblin wrote, the Commandant
and the Sergeant Major “specifically requested to sit down with my
platoon. . . . walked around, talked to [platoon members], congratulated
them. . . . shook everyone’s hand, gave them a coin and told them they
had done a great job. It meant a lot.”16

“Piss on these assholes.”

The urination incident took place less than five months after the scout
sniper platoon had deployed to Afghanistan. They had become extremely
experienced in the region and had acquired a solid understanding of the
enemy and its activities. Over several weeks of monitoring an area near
the small village of Sandalah, where the Taliban presence was heavy and
their activity particularly intense, the platoon identified several valuable
targets; they focused on a Taliban command cell.
Seventeen marines, mainly from Team 4, left Patrol Base (PB) 7171
in the early hours of July 27, 2011, to take position close to the village.
Pushing into a territory the battalion rarely had ventured in before, the
patrol covered a few miles while avoiding IEDs and several Taliban
observation points. They arrived in place at five o’clock in the morning.
A little after seven, the scout snipers engaged the enemy, killing twelve
and suffering no casualties.17 Then they received the order from their
command to retrieve a few of the closest Taliban bodies. Chamblin
strongly opposed the request, which he considered to be “completely
unfitting for a sniper mission.”18 Yet as the fight subsided, the snipers

13      Ibid., 143.
14      Ibid.
15      Dan Lamothe, “General: More Than 100 Kills for Some Marine Snipers”, BattleRattle (blog),
Marine Corps Times, September 1, 2011.
16      Gina Harkins, “Exclusive: Controversial Marine Sniper Fires Back at Critics, Military Times,
October 31, 2013.
17       Chamblin, 182–84; and Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC),
Command Investigation into the Alleged Desecration of Corpses by U.S. Marines in Afghanistan (Quantico, VA:
MCCDC, 2012), 26–28.
18      Chamblin, 188.
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sent two Afghans with a wheelbarrow to transport the bodies to a
temporary compound.
Standing there in a brief silence, knowing the men laying dead [at] our feet
were responsible for inflicting pain and misery on our fellow Marines, I felt
a surge of anger deep in my bones. They had taken the life of a man whom
I considered a brother. They’d also gathered his mutilated body parts and
hung them in a tree for us to find. I stood burning inside. Someone jokingly
said, “Piss on these assholes!” The joke died almost instantly, and we couldn’t
help ourselves. Hell, urinating on them still showed more respect for their
dead than they showed of ours.19

Intention of the Individual

When watching the infamous short video of the incident, the marines
appear as if they did what they intended to do. Whether they truly
understood the nature of their actions, however, is unclear. Considering
their experience and training, they should have known their behavior
was unethical and unprofessional. Their conduct, therefore, might be
considered intended unethicality. Yet, analysis reveals the possibility that,
when they decided to urinate on the dead enemies, the marines’ ability to
see the ethical dimension of the action was significantly compromised
or, more likely, completely absent. They were ethically blind.
During his court martial, Staff Sergeant Edward W. Deptola, the
platoon sergeant, expressed regret for not stopping the other marines
from urinating on the enemy bodies. Deptola said, “I was in a position
to stop it and I did not. . . . I should have spoken up on the spot.”20 When
Lieutenant Colonel Nicole Hudspeth, the judge advocate, questioned
Deptola’s motive, he said: “I have no excuse, no reason, ma’am . . . it was
not the correct way to handle a human casualty.”21 It is unclear whether
Deptola regretted not intervening during the incident or condoning the
marines’ behavior. Yet, Chamblin wrote, “Later, when asked why we did
it, Dep [Deptola] said it best. ‘Killing these assholes was not enough.’ ”22
Neither Chamblin nor Richards showed remorse for the incident.
But, what they said helps us understand their behavior. In their minds,
urinating on dead enemies did not constitute desecration, or a war crime,
rather it was a strong victory statement. They had vanquished a brutal
enemy. Chamblin explained,
I didn’t see anything wrong with it. I would do it again. It wasn’t like we had
some random Afghans laying there. They were insurgents, they had weapons
and they were trying to kill us. The same guys were making IEDs and trying
to kill Marines. If they could get over here, they would cut off the heads of
everybody in this room right now. That’s how they are. And you know what?
I won that day. They didn’t.23

At least two factors that influenced the behavior of this small
team are revealed by the events surrounding the incident. For the first
time into the deployment, they had been asked to bring corpses to the
battalion command post. Such a task is unusual for a sniper unit; indeed,
19      Chamblin, 191.
20      “US Marine Pleads Guilty to Urinating on Corpse of Taliban Fighter in Afghanistan,”
Guardian, January 16, 2013.
21      Ibid.
22      Chamblin, 191.
23      Harkins, “Exclusive.”
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Chamblin unsuccessfully pushed back on his chain of command. Yet,
the command’s request put them in close contact with the enemy bodies.
After the incident and before leaving the area, the unit had two locals
load the dead enemies on top of a tank. Despite the fact that body bags,
required by regulations, should have been available, they were not used.
According to Chamblin, once all the equipment was loaded and the dead
bodies were placed on the tank, they decided to ride back to the base on
the tank. It became a victory parade that Chamblin remembered proudly.
Displaying the dead insurgents atop the tanks sent a strong message to the
enemy and the locals. We were the lions, the victors. Riding on top of the
tanks, despite the stench of stinking bodies, felt great, how the Mongols
must have felt riding their horses after a hard fought battle. . . . We were
welcomed back to the Battalion Command post like conquering heroes.24

A growing body of research into ethical behavior and decisionmaking, clearly indicates that individuals confronted with ethical
choices have a tendency to behave in a significantly less rational way
than expected, or not rationally at all.25 Often their decisions are in
direct conflict with their values and their training.26 Looking at decisions
and behaviors from outside a situation, others easily and clearly see the
ethical dimension and implications; yet such clarity for those immersed
in the situation might be compromised.
Guido Palazzo noted “(un)ethical decision making is less rational
and deliberate but more intuitive and automatic. As a consequence, the
ethical dimension of a decision is not necessarily visible to the decision
maker. People may behave unethically without being aware of it—they
may even be convinced that they are doing the right thing.”27 Thus,
when an individual becomes unable to see the ethical dimension of the
decision-making process, a state of ethical blindness develops.
Shaped by combat, servicemembers might tend to act upon unitdefined, socially-approved behaviors.28 Taking place over several months,
a process of ethical fading likely was encouraged, unintentionally although
irresponsibly, by the more senior leaders of the organization, who were
distracted by the excellent outcomes of the scout sniper platoon. In the
deployment workups, battalion leaders already noted an independent
spirit as the sniper platoon failed to observe the standards of the other
marines. A few months into the deployment, battalion leaders could
see the snipers’ behavior was departing from the Marine Corps’s sound
ethical and professional standards. Captain Rudyard S. Olmstead, Kilo
Company’s commander, noted the scout sniper platoon displayed a poor
level of discipline in the way they wore the uniform, and when superiors
addressed the issue, the scout snipers simply disregarded it. Olmstead
24      Chamblin, 192–93.
25      Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (New York: Harper
Collins, 2008).
26      David DeSteno and Piercarlo Valdesolo, Out of Character: The Surprising Truths about the Liar,
Cheat, Sinner (and Saint) Lurking in All of Us (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011); and Max H.
Bazerman and Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Blind Spots: Why We Fail To Do What’s Right and What To Do about
It (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
27      Guido Palazzo, Franciska Krings, and Ulrich Hoffrage, “Ethical Blindness,” Journal of Business
Ethics 109, no. 3 (September 2012): 324, doi:10.1007/s10551-011-1130-4.
28      Ann E. Tenbrunsel and David M. Messick, “Ethical Fading: The Role of SelfDeception in Unethical Behavior,” Social Justice Research 17, no. 2 (June 2004): 226,
doi:10.1023/B:SORE.0000027411.35832.53.
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explained, “we ultimately kind of gave up and said, ‘Well, they’re doing
great stuff outside the wire.’ ”29

Impact of the Situation

To understand an individual’s unethical behavior, it is important
to explore where the behavior took place, the situation in which the
conduct occurred, and how the individual perceived and constructed
the situation as an individual and within a group. The situation can be
very powerful and have great influence on individual behavior. Palazzo
explained “some situations are so powerful that they elicit a specific
behavior in many people, independently of intentions, level of moral
developments, values or reasoning.”30 Indeed, leaders should always
consider how the environment in which they operate could trigger
unethical behavior without their intention.31
Philip Zimbardo, a social psychologist who has undertaken
ground-breaking studies on the impact the situation has on individuals,
stressed the key to understanding unethical behavior is not to consider
immediately the individuals responsible as bad apples, which is a clearly
biased approach. Often they might well be “good apples” operating in a
powerful, very dangerous, highly stressful, “bad barrel.”32 In a situation
permeated by strong, powerful forces, it is possible for individuals to
lose their ability to see the difference between right and wrong and the
application of such judgments.
The scout sniper platoon deployed and operated in a situation of
great physical and psychological stress. The loss of several marines who
were part of, or close to someone within, the very tight-knit sniper
organization made an already demanding situation significantly worse.
On June 3, Sergeant Mark Bradley, the assistant team leader for Team
2, was fatally injured by an IED. Corporal Steven Bradley, a sniper
with Team 4, escorted his brother to Bethesda, where Mark died on
June 16. On June 11, Lance Corporal Aaron Hill, a sniper with Team 3,
accompanied the body of his brother—Lance Corporal Jason Hill, 3/4,
who was killed by small arms fire just a few miles from where the scout
sniper platoon was operating—back to the United States.

Role of Command Climate

The behavior of the marines on July 27 can only partially be
explained as dispositional, situational, or a combination of both. The
individual marines responsible for urinating on the dead enemies were
distinguished servicemembers who had performed extremely well in
previous deployments and had demonstrated their proficiency. Several
US Marine units had deployed in similar or even worse environments,
suffered a higher number of casualties and inflicted major blows on the
Taliban over a number of years. Yet, marines in these situations did not
engage in unethical or unprofessional behavior. Therefore, to understand
29      “Marine 4-Star General Offers Powerful Testimony in Defense of Accused Officer,” Military
Times, October 17, 2013.
30      Palazzo, 329.
31      Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 20.
32      Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York:
Random House, 2008); and Tenbrunsel, 20.
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why this small unit behaved in such an unethical and unprofessional
manner, the role of the system—the command climate—in failing to
discourage the behavior must be considered.33
According to Zimbardo, “systems matter the most” because
they “provide the institutional support, authority, and resources that
allow situations to operate as they do.”34 Zimbardo emphasized the
negative side of systems, yet when inspired and regulated by ethical
and professionally sound principles, systems play an important role in
preventing members of an organization operating in a stressful powerful
situation to engage in unethical behavior. Moreover, leaders—whose
responsibility, and commitment, is to make sure that systems are inspired
by “norms, morals, and ethics”—might unintentionally become victims
of a powerful situation. As a result they might compromise their ability
to “regulate/control and shape” the system to be as effective as possible
at interacting with the situation while providing strong motivations and
clear guidance for individuals to behave ethically and professionally.
While conducting the Stanford Prison Experiment, Zimbardo even
fell victim to this dangerous dynamic. The fictitious prison system
he devised included his leadership role as the warden; however, the
organization degraded from the first night shift. Hazing, initiated by a
group of student-guards on a group of student-inmates, escalated in a
matter of days.
Zimbardo acknowledged the student-inmates were quickly subjected
to forms of punishment that made them suffer, which was unacceptable
and unethical for a scientific experiment. Yet, he failed to see how quickly
the ethical dimension of the experiment was degrading. Zimbardo was so
absorbed by the experiment and the progression of behavior that he lost
the ability to recognize the unethical and unprofessional conditions for
both the student-guards and student-inmates. His ability to provide the
system with positive inputs was compromised as he became distracted
by the “encouraging” results of the experiment.
If Zimbardo and his team continued to focus on the amazing
and unexpected evolution of human behavior, it is very unlikely that
they would have stopped the experiment. Even when prison inmate
8612 had a nervous breakdown, when “things begin to turn sexual”
during the fourth day, and when a student-inmate broke down every
night thereafter, Zimbardo failed to comprehend the experiment was
out of control.35 Dr. Craig W. Haney, a researcher who participated in
the experiment, remembers the break downs “were scary to see, were
upsetting to us, they were unexpected, they were very clearly the real
thing . . . we had not built in time to step back and to look at what was
happening. . . . We were caught up in the events that were taking place.”36
Despite indications that the experiment was corrupted by major
unethical behavior that impacted the student-inmates, and despite
33      On page 234 of “Ethical Fading,” Tenbrunsel and Messick stress “one set of variables that
leads to unethical behavior are the environmental or contextual cues that exist in an organization.
Organizations should thus identify the structural, institutional, and systematic factors that promote
unethical behavior.”
34      Zimbardo, 226.
35      “The Stanford Prison Experiment,” Heroic Imagination, August 20, 2011, https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=sZwfNs1pqG0.
36      Ibid.
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the fact that Zimbardo and his team should have known that such
behavior was unacceptable for a scientific experiment, they carried on.
Arguably this was a case of unintended unethicality. The experiment
likely would have continued for the planned two-week period, possibly
with terrible, yet unintended consequences if Christina Maslach, an
assistant professor of psychology at University of California Berkeley
and romantic acquaintance of Zimbardo, had not visited the “Stanford
Prison” five days into the study.37 She was shocked by the “madhouse,”
but even more surprised that “Phil seemed to be so different from the
man [she] thought [she] knew, someone who loves students and cares for
them in ways that were already legendary at the university. He was not
the same man that [she] had come to love.”38
Zimbardo the experimenter successfully created a situation in which
role-playing students behaved in ways that stimulated his scientific interest
and validated several of his assumptions. Zimbardo the warden failed to
regulate the system to prevent degradation. His main focus was on the
experiment—his mission—which distracted him from his responsibility
to protect the mental and physical wellbeing of the students. Zimbardo
had fallen into the leader’s trap, and Maslach came to his rescue. After
a tense argument, Zimbardo—alerted to the fact that he had become a
victim of his own experiment—decided to call it off.
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Doty and Major Joe Gelineau stressed the
role played by command climate in preventing or encouraging unethical
behavior: “Historically, there are examples of questionable command
climates resulting in behaviors that are not in tune with our professional
military ethic or a result of character-based leadership.”39
According to a previous field manual, Army Leadership, “an
organization’s climate is the way its members feel about their
organization. Climate comes from people’s shared perceptions and
attitudes, what they believe about the day-to-day functioning of their
outfit. These things have a great impact on their motivation and the
trust they feel for their team and their leaders.”40 The role leaders play
in shaping and maintaining a healthy command climate is pivotal:
“The members’ collective sense of the organization—its organizational
climate—is directly attributable to the leader’s values, skills, and actions.
As an Army leader, you establish the climate of your organization, no
matter how small it is or how large.”41 Doty and Gelineau rightly noted
Command climate is set at the battalion level. Although brigade-and-above
commanders will establish a command climate, it is at the battalion level
where the most profound and effective influence occurs. Battalion-level
commanders . . . most closely “touch” and influence soldiers’ attitudes and
behaviors. Counterinsurgency operations, which are often decentralized
at company- and platoon-level operations, highlight the importance of
battalion commanders establishing and enforcing—by their presence
(“leadership by walking around”)—a moral/ethical command climate.
37      Philip G. Zimbardo, Christina Maslach, and Craig Haney, “Reflections on the Stanford Prison
Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences,” in Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives
on the Milgram Paradigm, ed. Thomas Blass (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000), 215.
38      Ibid., 216–17.
39      LTC Joseph Doty and MAJ Joe Gelineau, “Command Climate,” Army 58, no. 7 (July 2008): 22.
40       Headquarters, US Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Field Manual 22-100
(Washington, DC: HQDA, 1999), 3-12.
41      Ibid.
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Company commanders and platoon leaders are at the execution level of
the battalion commander’s command climate. . . . Most importantly, if a
battalion level commander does not set and enforce a command climate,
subclimates will be established by leaders in the unit [emphasis by the
author]. Subordinate leaders within the unit with referent and expert power
(charisma) will establish subcultures that may or may not be what the unit
commander desires. Setting a moral/ethical command climate must be an
intentional process by commanders and is a requirement to maintain the
moral high ground in this era of persistent conflict.42

The initiatives taken by 3/2’s commanding officer before the
deployment, and in particular the design and implementation of the
ethics training program focused on the professional and moral actions of
small unit leaders, indicated a strong commitment to a healthy command
climate. Yet after the battalion deployed to Afghanistan, the overall
strength of the command climate eroded, probably unintentionally
and over a number of months. The Command Investigation into the Alleged
Desecration of Corpses by U.S. Marines in Afghanistan noted a “high turnover
rate in the chain of command. Turnover of key leadership billets
within Kilo Company, immediately before and during deployment in
Afghanistan, contributed to an environment where necessary discipline
standards were lacking. Team 4, Scout Sniper Platoon 3/2 operated from
PB 7171, considered to be the base with the worst discipline standard in
[Regimental Combat Team]-8’s area of operations.”43 The investigation
also noted
Kilo Company discipline issues ranged from the state of police to
accountability. Specifically, PB 7171 was found to have: (1) marines not
wearing [personal protective equipment], in dirty uniforms, without haircuts,
and not shaving; (2) unsanitary conditions and ammunition on the deck;
(3) insufficient patrol orders being issued, fighting positions without range
cards or identified primary directions of fire, and marines not conducting
appropriate drills and inspections.44

These concerns were brought to the attention of the 3/2 leadership
while division and marine expeditionary force leaders praised body
counts, open roads, and increased market activity to validate the
success of the surge. The tactical success gave the command a sense
that everything was under control. Yet, General John F. Kelly stressed
that 3/2 was “loose in the way it did business” and “a lot of people
doing great things but general confusion in how people were organized
for combat.”45

Consequences of a Slippery Slope

Often, ethical and professional blunders such as the urination
incident are viewed and treated as isolated events. Indeed, at this time
there is no known evidence of similar behavior from other Marine units
who deployed in Afghanistan. All of those units fought a tough enemy
while displaying honorable behavior. Yet, the urination incident, although
specific to the unit, is not isolated: it belongs to a broader context.

42      Ibid., 24.
43      MCCDC, Command Investigation, 53–54.
44      Ibid., 24
45      “Marine 4-Star.”
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For the scout sniper platoon, it is quite clear that many indicators of
a healthy system—the unit culture, discipline, obedience, and cohesion
of the command climate—were compromised. It also appears that
the frame—the filter through which the scout snipers perceived their
situation—had become particularly rigid. They had moved into an
“us-them” frame, in which “us” were only the members of the platoon
and “them” were not only the enemy but also fellow marines who
did not approve of the snipers’ conduct. In his book, Chamblin often
was less than pleased, and at times very frustrated, with anyone who
tried to address the scout sniper discipline issues and who disapproved
of their behavior.46
Thus, under a rigid frame and a deteriorated unit subclimate, urinating
on the dead enemy bodies likely revealed more about the overall state
of the platoon rather than a momentary lapse of judgment (for which
many of the involved marines have yet to show any sign of remorse). The
incident indicated the unit’s command climate had reached a dangerous
level and worse behavior might have been very likely. The unit’s constant
transgressions and breach in discipline were not properly addressed
and were ultimately tolerated by the chain of command. Though likely
unintentional, this dynamic created a dangerous slippery slope.
For a number of reasons, leaders might not enforce a unit’s
standards. Leaders might want to give their subordinates a break,
they might not want to be perceived as too tough, and perhaps, they
might even sympathize with perceptions of micromanagement. Such
approaches hide dangerous dynamics and make it difficult to see more
serious unit infractions.
Lieutenant General William R. Peers, the senior Army officer
who investigated the My Lai incident, provided much wisdom and
enlightening reflections on the role leaders play in preventing war crimes,
which retain great validity today. Some of Peer’s leadership requirements
for a counterinsurgency environment, include:
A commander must be constantly alert to changes in the attitude and
temperament of his men and the units to which they belong. Ground
combat in a counterinsurgency environment may develop frustration and
bitterness which manifest themselves in acts quite apart from that which
would normally be expected. Accordingly, commanders must be quick to
spot such changes and to take appropriate corrective action.47

Bazerman and Tenbrunsel emphasized “if we find minor infractions
acceptable, research suggests, we are likely to accept increasingly major
infractions as long as each violation is only incrementally more serious
than the preceding one.”48 Kelly clearly identified such an issue: “It’s a
slippery slope to urinating on corpses, to raping women, to murdering
kids.”49 This analysis is a strong professional reminder of how dangerous
46      In the final pages of his book, Chamblin wrote that after the incident had been revealed “the
only group of people that stood by my men and me, was our fellow scout/snipers, a Brotherhood of
shared pain. These men went out of their way to help and defend us, with one exception, Sergeant
Major Michael [sic] Barrett, then Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps. Sergeant Major Barrett was
a former Scout/Sniper Instructor and as it turns out, Uncle Tom extraordinaire! What a piece of
shit” (212).
47      William R. Peers, The My Lai Inquiry (New York: Norton, 1979), 248.
48      Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, “Ethical Breakdowns,” 63.
49      “Marine 4-Star.”
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and costly tolerating behavior that gradually departs from accepted
standards can be. If the unit deployment had been longer than seven
months, it is possible the marines would not have engaged in the type of
war crimes Kelly mentioned. Yet it is also true that the unit would have
been more inclined to engage in such behaviors than other units with a
strong command climate.

Conclusions

The urination incident is an extremely insightful case that provides
valuable understanding on why members of an organization might
engage in unethical and unprofessional behavior and the pivotal role
that the command climate plays in determining such a behavior.
Before the deployment to Afghanistan, the marines of the 3/2 scout
sniper platoon certainly would have been considered above average, but
more likely outstanding. They had the experience, the time-in-service,
the commitment, and the desire to serve that are typical of solid marines.
The situation into which the unit deployed was extremely powerful, yet it
was no different from the situation in which thousands of other marines
operated ethically and professionally.
Notably, the battalion commander was genuinely committed
to preparing his marines for the difficult ethical challenges of a
counterinsurgency environment. He wanted his marines to be able to
make sound ethical choices while operating among civilians. In many
respects, Dixon was an innovative thinker who invested a significant
amount of time in ethics instruction when other commanders would
have valued other areas of tactical training.
Yet, despite the best of intentions, 3/2’s leaders became distracted by
the achievements of the scout sniper platoon as they became associated
with the overall success of the battalion. This mindset probably detracted
from the necessity of enforcing and maintaining sound marine standards
with the scout sniper platoon.
Commanders might find reprimanding a supporting unit or
organization uncomfortable, and to a certain extent challenging,
especially when such a unit is instrumental to the success of the larger
organization. Leaders might become inclined to condone and accept
minor infractions of the standard, which are mistakenly perceived as
harmless, for fear of compromising the enthusiasm of a successful
unit. The danger is for leaders to compliment immediate, visible,
positive results that enable the success of the entire organization
while underestimating the long-term, latent, negative consequences of
unethical and unprofessional behavior within supporting units. Allowing
the command climate to depart gradually from institutional standards
can incite a dangerous process whose outcome is the slippery slope. As
then-Commandant of the Marine Corps General James F. Amos wrote:
“There is a disturbingly frequent correlation between Marines who act
poorly and units with poor climate.”50
Our analysis of the 3/2 scout sniper platoon indicates the command
climate plays an important, if not the most important, role in preventing
unethical and unprofessional behavior. The command climate is like
50      General James Amos, white letter, “Command Climate,” May 9, 2013, Washington, DC.
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a double-edged sword: it has the potential to discourage and prevent
unethical and unprofessional behavior, or indeed, it might encourage
unethical and unprofessional behavior. Clearly, there might be cases in
which units with a strong command climate might experience members
engaging in unethical and unprofessional behavior; conversely, units
with a weak or degraded command climate might experience a difficult
deployment without instances of inappropriate behavior.
What should be acknowledged, however, is that units with a
resilient command climate will be better prepared to deal with stressful
deployments and situations while also being significantly less likely
to have members of the organization engaging in unethical behavior.
The command climate serves as a filter between the situation and the
individual and is regulated by organizational leaders; the more effective
the filter is, the better the behavior of the individuals.
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